Wednesday, November 9, 2011

One More time, lets talk about Vishakhapatnam Port

Nepal is one more time going to table the issue of Visakhapatnam port in the Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) meeting with India . This issue has been discussed with India since more than a decade with India. The Indian Premier Dr. Manmohan Singh had agreed with his Nepali counterpart Dr. Baburam Bhattrai in latter's India visit last month. The IGC meeting is held in every six months between two countries' joint secretary level. This IGC meeting is going to be a small platform to see how much Indian side is positive to upgrade the Nepal's international and regional trade.
 

Sunday, November 6, 2011

Weak Economic Diplomacy is a Constant Problem for Nepal's Regional and International Trade


Since more than a decade Nepal is constantly requesting with India to get facility of using the Visakhapatnam port for a better trade with the third countries. Almost in each of the bilateral meeting, Nepali side keeps the issue on table. India never says, 'No'. But till the date, India is not ready to materialize its words into action. One more time India has agreed to give the facility of using Visakhapatnam port during the premier Dr. Baburam Bhattari's visit in last month--October. Nepal is suffering from different problems, like congestion, in Kolkata and Haldiya ports.
In few many informal discussions, officials from Ministry of Commerce and Supply admit that Nepal is lacking the diplomatic effort to push India. This is just a reflection of Nepal-India trade issues. Keep in mind that, we have more than 50 years old Treaty of Trade and Transit with India.
Our Northern neighbor, China is constantly working on its part to upgrade the infrastructures in the border for more volume of trade between Nepal and China. In April 2010, China gave the zero-tariff treatment to the 3 hundred 61 products, which is almost 95 percent of Nepal's total products, to reduce the trade imbalance between two countries.
But where do we have the supply list, what China is expecting to import from Nepal? What China wants to export in Nepal, does china consider Nepal as a potential market for its quality products? Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Qui Guohong is emphasizing on establishing the Trade Areas and Special Economic Zones to vitalize the trade between two countries.
These two cases with our two neighboring countries show that both of them have their own economic diplomacy. What we lack here in Nepal is the sound economic diplomacy. We don't have a balanced approach to our neighbors when it comes to the economic diplomacy. There are enough cases of our unwillingness to maintain the balance. The Chinese pro-activeness in bilateral trade increment and India's cosmetic flavor in the political levels implicitly signify that Nepal do not have its own standard in the diplomatic level to enhance the trade.
The supply-side constraints of our country are understandable but what we are not acknowledging is the 'comfort-zone' of our diplomats towards widening the trade partners. This is the time to get one clear answer why Nepal is not being able to have a direct discussion with Bangladesh about the transit and at the same time why China gives grant to the military force of Nepal but any support to enhance the situation of industrial sector? These questions deserve the answers and answer is 'lack of economic diplomacy of country'.
Nepal has specifically three Commercial Ambassadors in India, Hongkong and Tibet. What our Commercial Ambassadors are doing over there and what is the reason behind government's initiation few months back to send the commercial ambassadors to Spain and Portugal? United States of America could have been one option to send the commercial ambassador or to any another country with which we have a significant volume of bilateral trade. The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) between Nepal and America, which happened this year, is one of the examples of Nepali side's recklessness while signing any agreement either it’s a bilateral one or a multilateral one. The TIFA is just a formality. Honorable ambassador to USA Dr. Shankar Sharma himself is a scholar of economic discipline but what happened while signing the agreement was embarrassing to any citizen of Nepal. Nepal has got not a single privilege from TIFA that other LDCs have not got already from USA.
Nepal entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 2004. This forum is one of the most vibrant multilateral platforms for any country in the world. WTO negotiations are always stressful for country like Nepal which has the huge amount of trade with one country--India--with whom the WTO norms do not apply. Nepal's clear failure in economic diplomacy is not being able to revise the Treaty of Trade and Transit, 1960 with India.
Here arises a prominent question that why everything seems functioning and sound in the political level between Nepal and India but in diplomatic levels? This implies our failure on economic diplomacy. India's sound, favorable and supportive face is not the real, if it was it would have been ready to let Nepal and Bangladesh have a bilateral talk for their betterment. But it doesn't in practical term. Again it goes to the same bottle that we have very weak position in every way.
China's proactive approach to strengthen the bilateral trade is also within the circle of doubt. There are rooms which prove again that China's intention is not clear. It has given the zero-tariff treatment to Nepali products and at the same time helping to develop the dry port in Tatopani but this is just a rosy gift to Nepal. China has given the zero-tariff treatment for 4 thousand 7 hundred 21 products from different Least Developed Countries (LDCs). What China is doing with Nepal might be something but do we have any guts say no for that we don't need and tell them what our priorities are. We have the Currently, Nepal and China has Rs 36 billion trade and Nepal suffers Rs 32 billion trade imbalance.



Nepal needs to take decisive actions : IMF

In the IMF's latest notice http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn11134.htm, it has strongly suggested Nepal to make a 'structural reform'. 'Nepal's central bank leadership is being more and more immature and taking very short term measures in the financial sector', blames Dipendra Bahadur Kshetry, the vice president of National Planning Commission http://www.npc.gov.np/.

By showing the inefficiency of Nepal's Central Bank, IMF has said that for the productivity and potential growth there should be the structural reform as soon as possible. Another point that the Nepal side should be aware is that IMF has asked it to take the 'decisive action' to balance the fragile situation of economic situation.  

Thursday, February 17, 2011

खाद्यान्न अभाव कायमै

भोजराज पौडेल,काठमाडौं

विश्व खाद्य कार्यक्रम (डब्लूएफपी) ले यस वर्ष पनि नेपालमा खाद्यान्न अभाव कायम रहने जनाएको छ । प्रकाशन तयारीमा रहेको डब्लूएफपी प्रतिवेदनले नेपालमा सन् २००९ देखि ह्वात्तै बढेर गएको खाद्यान्न अभाव २०११ मा पनि कायम रहने देखाएको हो । सन् २००९ को तुलनामा २०१० मा खाद्यान्न अभाव १ सय ३९ प्रतिशतले बढेको थियो ।
“यस वर्ष अघिल्लो वर्षजति अभाव नहुने भए पनि सुधारका संकेत देखिएका छैनन्,” प्रतिवेदनमा भनिएको छ । यद्यपि उसले अभावको मात्रा भने बाहिर ल्याएको छैन ।
डब्लूएफपीको तथ्यांकअनुसार सन् २००९ मा १ लाख ३२ हजार मेट्रिक टन खाद्यान्न अभाव रहेकोमा सन् २०१० मा बढेर ३ लाख १६ हजार मेट्रिक टन पुगेको थियो ।
समयमा पानी परेका कारण केही निश्चित भूभागलाई छाडेर अन्य क्षेत्रमा उत्पादकत्व बढे पनि उत्पादनमा खासै सुधार नआउने डब्लूएफपीले जनाएको छ । गत वर्ष नेपालका झन्डै ४३ जिल्लामा खाद्यान्न अभाव थियो ।
सुदूरपश्चिममा देखिएको संकटको समस्या विस्तारै उर्वर मानिएको तराई भेगतर्फ पनि सरेको प्रतिवेदनले देखाएको छ । तराईका सप्तरी र धनुषा जिल्लामा २००९ को तुलनामा क्रमशः २८ र २० प्रतिशतले वर्षे बाली उत्पादन घटेको छ ।
प्रतिवेदनअनुसार सप्तरीमा २००९ मा १ लाख ६७ हजार मेट्रिक टन धान उत्पादन भएको थियो भने २०१० मा घटेर जम्मा १ लाख २० हजार ६ सय ११ मेट्रिक टन पुगेको थियो । त्यस्तै, धनुषामा २००९ मा १ लाख ५० हजार ४ सय ७७ मेट्रिक टन धान उत्पादन भएकोमा २०१० मा घटेर १ लाख २३ हजार ३ सय ५२ मेट्रिक टन उत्पादन भएको छ । समयमा वर्षा नहुँदा र व्यवस्थित सिँचाइ सुविधाको अभावमा धान उत्पादन घटेको डब्लूएफपीले जनाएको छ ।
समाचार एजेन्सी इन्टिग्रेटेड रिजनल इन्फर्मेसन नेटवक्र्स (आईआरआईएन अर्थात् इरिन) ले नेपालमा सिँचाइको अवस्था नाजुक भएकाले बाली उत्पादनमा ह्रास आएको समाचार सम्प्रेषण गरेको छ । विज्ञहरूको हवाला दिँदै उसले नेपालमा खाद्यान्न अभाव पूर्ति गर्न व्यवस्थित सिँचाइ अत्यावश्यक रहेको बताएको छ । यसका लागि सरकारले पहलकदमी गर्नुपर्ने इरिनले उल्लेख गरेको छ ।
सन् १९७० सम्म नेपाल खाद्यान्न निर्यात गर्ने मुलुकमा पथ्र्यो । त्यसयताका दशकमा नेपालले निरन्तर खाद्यान्न आयात गर्दै आएको छ । खाद्य असुरक्षाको जोखिम तथा आपतकालीन खाद्यान्न सुविधा उपलब्ध गराउने डब्लूएफपीले सन् १९६३ देखि नेपालमा काम गर्दै आएको छ ।
कृषि तथा सहकारी मन्त्रालयका अनुसार नेपालमा प्रतिहेक्टर २.५ टन बाली उत्पादन हुन्छ । सन् १९७० सम्म कुल जनसंख्याको दुईतिहाइ हिमाली तथा पहाडी भेगमा बसोबास गर्थे भने बाँकी एकतिहाई तराई क्षेत्रमा थिए । पहाडी तथा हिमाली भेगमा निरन्तर खाद्यान्न अभाव चुलिँदै गएपछि मानिसहरू क्रमशः तराई क्षेत्रमा बसाइसराइ गर्न बाध्य भएका छन् । उच्च जनसंख्या वृद्धिदर र असमान जनसंख्या वितरणका कारण तराई क्षेत्रमा समेत खाद्यान्न अभाव देखिएको छ ।

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Asia's Inflation Trap

Asia has an inflation problem. The sooner it comes to grips with its problem, the better. Unfortunately, the appropriate sense of urgency is missing.
Willingness to tackle inflation is impeded by Asia’s heavy reliance on exports and external demand. Fearful of a relapse of end-market demand in a still-shaky post-crisis world, Asian policymakers have been reluctant to take an aggressive stand for price stability. That needs to change – before it’s too late.
Excluding Japan, which remains mired in seemingly chronic deflation, Asian inflation rose to 5.3% in the 12 months ending in November 2010, up markedly from the 3.5% rate a year earlier. Trends in the region’s two giants are especially worrisome, with inflation having pierced the 5% threshold in China and running in excess of 8% in India. Price growth is worrisome in Indonesia (7%), Singapore (3.8%), Korea (3.5%), and Thailand (3%) as well.
Yes, sharply rising food prices are an important factor in boosting headline inflation in Asia. But this is hardly a trivial development for low-income families in the developing world, where the share of foodstuffs in household budgets – 46% in India and 33% in China – is 2-3 times the ratio in developed countries.
At the same time, there has been a notable deterioration in underlying “core” inflation, which strips out food and energy prices. Annual core inflation for Asia (excluding Japan) was running at a 4% rate in late 2010 – up about one percentage point from late 2009.
A key lesson from the Great Inflation of the 1970’s is that central banks can’t afford a false sense of comfort from any dichotomy between headline and core inflation. Spillover effects are inevitable, and once a corrosive increase in inflationary expectations sets in, it becomes all the more painful to unwind. The good news for Asia is that most of the region’s monetary authorities are, in fact, tightening policy. The bad news is that they have been generally slow to act.
Financial markets appear to be expecting a good deal more Asian monetary tightening – at least that’s the message that can be drawn from sharply appreciating Asian currencies, which seem to be responding to prospective moves in policy interest rates. Relative to the US dollar, an equal-weighted basket of 10 major Asian currencies (excluding Japan) has retraced the crisis-related distortions of 2008-2009 and has now returned to pre-crisis highs.
Export-led economies, of course, can’t take currency appreciation lightly – it undermines competitiveness and risks eroding the country’s share of the global market. It also invites destabilizing hot-money capital inflows. Given the tenuous post-crisis climate, with uncertain demand prospects in the major markets of the developed world, Asia finds itself in a classic policy trap, dragging its feet on monetary tightening while risking the negative impact of stronger currencies.
There is only one way out for Asia: a significant increase in real, or inflation-adjusted, policy interest rates. Benchmark policy rates are currently below headline inflation in India, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. They are only slightly positive in China, Taiwan, and Malaysia.
The lessons of earlier battles against inflation are clear on one fundamental point: inflationary pressures cannot be contained by negative, or slightly positive, real short-term interest rates. The only effective anti-inflation strategy entails aggressive monetary tightening that takes policy rates into the restrictive zone. The longer this is deferred, the more wrenching the ultimate policy adjustment – and its consequences for growth and employment – will be. With inflation – both headline and core – now on an accelerating path, Asian central banks can’t afford to slip further behind the curve.
Asia has far too many important items on its strategic agenda to remain caught in a policy trap. This is especially true of China, whose government is focused on the pro-consumption rebalancing imperatives of its soon-to-be-enacted 12th Five-Year Plan.
So far, the Chinese leadership has adopted a measured approach to inflation. Its efforts focus mainly on increasing banks’ mandatory reserve ratios while introducing administrative measures to deal with food price pressures, approving a couple of token interest-rate hikes, and managing a modest upward adjustment in the currency.
The mix of Chinese policy tightening, however, needs to shift much more decisively toward higher interest rates. With the Chinese economy still growing at close to 10% per year, the government can afford to take more short-term policy risk in order to clear the way for its structural agenda.
Indeed, China’s dilemma is emblematic of one of developing Asia’s greatest challenges: the need to tilt the growth model away from external toward internal demand. That can’t happen without increased wages and purchasing power for workers. But, in an increasingly inflationary environment, any such efforts could fuel an outbreak of the dreaded wage-price spiral – the same lethal interplay that wreaked such havoc in the United States in the 1970’s. Asia can avoid this problem and get on with the heavy lifting of pro-consumption rebalancing only by nipping inflation in the bud.
Much is made of Asia’s Teflon-like resilience in an otherwise tough post-crisis climate. Led by China, the high-flying economies of developing Asia are increasingly viewed as the new and powerful engines of a multi-speed world. While the jury is out on whether there has really been such a seamless transition of global economic leadership, Asia must face up to the critical challenges that may come with this new role. Inflation, if not addressed now, could seriously compromise the region’s ability to meet those challenges.

Stephen S. Roach, a member of the faculty of Yale University, is Non-Executive Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of The Next Asia.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2011.
www.project-syndicate.org

Tuesday, January 25, 2011

The Emerging- Market Growth Engine

The key role of emerging and developing countries – including India, China, and Brazil – in sustaining world economic growth was brought into sharp focus during the recent global crisis, and has been well documented. This trend is likely to continue in 2011 and beyond.
Indeed, the IMF expects that emerging and developing economies will grow by 6% in 2010 and 6.3% in 2011. Emerging-market economies have not only cushioned the global impact of the recent crisis, but have also helped industrialized countries reverse the recessionary trend of 2008-2009. But recovery remains fragile in the developed world, with unemployment remaining at crisis levels.
But, while emerging economies are proving to be drivers of global demand, the right mix of government initiatives and policies is still required to ensure that they continue to provide the impetus for faster world economic recovery in the short term and be the engines of sustainable growth in the medium and long term. There is also a strong need for supporting long-term capital flows to emerging economies to stimulate investment further, particularly in their infrastructure sectors, thereby injecting much-needed additional demand into the global economy.
In this regard, another important development is the increasing number of emerging-market middle-class consumers, their growing purchasing power, and thus their potential impact on global demand. According to one estimate, middle-class consumers in a dozen emerging economies today wield annual purchasing power totaling approximately $6.9 trillion.
Indeed, projections from McKinsey & Company suggest that the purchasing power of this rising middle class in emerging markets may rise to $20 trillion over the next decade – twice the current level of consumption in the United States. The four biggest emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRICs) – are large producers and consumers of goods and services, and will also be important in shaping the pace, direction, and sustainability of global economic growth.
Let me turn to India specifically. In the five years preceding the 2008-2009 crisis, the Indian economy grew at an average rate of nearly 9% annually. During the crisis, annual growth slowed, but only to 6.7%, reflecting the economy’s inherent resilience. The growth rate subsequently recovered to 7.4% in 2009-2010, and we expect 9% growth by 2011-12.
The strength of the Indian economy is underpinned by a high saving rate and robust investment. The government’s prompt action to counter the crisis – fiscal stimulus, growth packages, and monetary easing – proved effective. A sound financial and banking system with limited exposure to global markets, together with the importance of domestic consumption in sustaining demand, has also helped. But what distinguishes India from other emerging economies, in particular China and the Southeast Asian countries, is that domestic demand, rather than exports, is the primary driver of growth.
A return to high growth rates globally will require a broader revival of demand. Needless to say, this will occur only gradually, particularly in the developed countries. Thus, India’s high growth rates will have to remain dependent on strong domestic demand. In order to meet this challenge, we are focusing on investments in infrastructure sectors such as power, telecommunications, roads, ports, and airports.
While the public sector will continue to play an important role, given the massive investment required, substantial private investment – including foreign investment – would be needed to address India’s huge “infrastructure deficit” and the financing gap that accompanies it. A strategy of private-public partnership has been adopted to address the infrastructure challenge. At the same time, we need to invest in our human capital, supporting the development and upgrading of the workforce’s skills and capacity for innovation.
At its summit in Seoul in November, the G-20 firmly placed development at the core of its agenda. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, underlining the importance of infrastructure investment, made the following proposal, which several leaders endorsed: “Recycling surplus savings into investment in developing countries will not only address the immediate demand imbalance, it will also help to address developmental imbalances. In other words, we should leverage imbalances of one kind to redress imbalances of the other kind.”
As we head into the second decade of the century, innovative ideas like using global savings or surpluses to finance infrastructure in emerging and developing countries should be pursued seriously. Doing so would not only sustain the growth momentum of these economies, but would contribute to global recovery by generating much-needed additional demand in the developed countries.
While the emerging economies’ global role will inevitably grow in the coming years, this shift will need to be anchored in a cooperative partnership with the developed world. As for India, our resilient democratic values, ability to manage diversity, and strong economic fundamentals underpin our country’s current global posture.
By Nirupama Rao (Courtesy: Project Syndicate)

Monday, January 10, 2011

New Year's Hope Against Hope

The time has come for New Year’s resolutions, a moment of reflection. When the last year hasn’t gone so well, it is a time for hope that the next year will be better.
For Europe and the United States, 2010 was a year of disappointment. It’s been three years since the bubble broke, and more than two since Lehman Brothers’ collapse. In 2009, we were pulled back from the brink of depression, and 2010 was supposed to be the year of transition: as the economy got back on its feet, stimulus spending could smoothly be brought down.
Growth, it was thought, might slow slightly in 2011, but it would be a minor bump on the way to robust recovery. We could then look back at the Great Recession as a bad dream; the market economy – supported by prudent government action – would have shown its resilience.
In fact, 2010 was a nightmare. The crises in Ireland and Greece called into question the euro’s viability and raised the prospect of a debt default. On both sides of the Atlantic, unemployment remained stubbornly high, at around 10%. Even though 10% of US households with mortgages had already lost their homes, the pace of foreclosures appeared to be increasing – or would have, were it not for legal snafus that raised doubts about America’s vaunted “rule of law.”
Unfortunately, the New Year’s resolutions made in Europe and America were the wrong ones. The response to the private-sector failures and profligacy that had caused the crisis was to demand public-sector austerity! The consequence will almost surely be a slower recovery and an even longer delay before unemployment falls to acceptable levels.
There will also be a decline in competitiveness. While China has kept its economy going by making investments in education, technology, and infrastructure, Europe and America have been cutting back.
It has become fashionable among politicians to preach the virtues of pain and suffering, no doubt because those bearing the brunt of it are those with little voice – the poor and future generations. To get the economy going, some people will, in fact, have to bear some pain, but the increasingly skewed income distribution gives clear guidance to whom this should be: Approximately a quarter of all income in the US now goes to the top 1%, while most Americans’ income is lower today than it was a dozen years ago. Simply put, most Americans didn’t share in what many called the Great Moderation, but was really the Mother of All Bubbles. So, should innocent victims and those who gained nothing from fake prosperity really be made to pay even more?
Europe and America have the same talented people, the same resources, and the same capital that they had before the recession. They may have overvalued some of these assets; but the assets are, by and large, still there. Private financial markets misallocated capital on a massive scale in the years before the crisis, and the waste resulting from underutilization of resources has been even greater since the crisis began. The question is, how do we get these resources back to work?
Debt restructuring – writing down the debts of homeowners and, in some cases, governments – will be key. It will eventually happen. But delay is very costly – and largely unnecessary.
Banks never wanted to admit to their bad loans, and now they don’t want to recognize the losses, at least not until they can adequately recapitalize themselves through their trading profits and the large spread between their high lending rates and rock-bottom borrowing costs. The financial sector will press governments to ensure full repayment, even when it leads to massive social waste, huge unemployment, and high social distress – and even when it is a consequence of their own mistakes in lending. 
But, as we know from experience, there is life after debt restructuring. No one would wish the trauma that Argentina went through in 1999-2002 on any other country. But the country also suffered in the years before the crisis – years of IMF bailouts and austerity –from high unemployment and poverty rates and low and negative growth.
Since the debt restructuring and currency devaluation, Argentina has had years of extraordinarily rapid GDP growth, with the annual rate averaging nearly 9%from 2003 to 2007. By 2009, national income was twice what it was at the nadir of the crisis, in 2002, and more than 75% above its pre-crisis peak.
Likewise, Argentina’s poverty rate has fallen by some three-quarters from its crisis peak, and the country weathered the global financial crisis far better than the US did –unemployment is high, but still only around 8%. We could only conjecture what would have happened if it had not postponed the day of reckoning for so long – or if it had tried to put it off further.
So this is my hope for the New Year: we stop paying attention to the so-called financial wizards who got us into this mess – and who are now calling for austerity and delayed restructuring – and start using a little common sense. If there is pain to be borne, the brunt of it should be felt by those responsible for the crisis, and those who benefited most from the bubble that preceded it.
Joseph E. Stiglitz is University Professor at Columbia University and a Nobel laureate in Economics. His latest book, Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy, is available in French, German, Japanese, and Spanish.